An investigation has been opened by the Hokkaido Maritime Safety Agency into the grounding of the 'Silver Breeze' on July 2, 2022, at Tomakomai's West Port, sparking serious concerns about maritime safety procedures. The incident, which left 140 passengers and crew unharmed, involved the ferry alliding with wave-dissipation blocks because the 59-year-old captain failed to properly check the ship's position before continuing to navigate. The investigation reveals serious lapses in safety protocols during ferry operations." This negligence is at the core of the investigation, which has led to the captain being sent documents accusing him of professional negligence. The 'Silver Breeze' suffered extensive damage during the incident, with the maximum length of the damage estimated at about 2.23 meters and the width at approximately two meters. After the accident, the ship was rendered temporarily unable to navigate, resulting in over 11 hours of delays before it finally docked. The captain later acknowledged his mistake, stating that he relied on his experience and navigated by sight alone. His admission brought to light the importance of maintaining rigorous navigational practices at sea. The accident has reignited discussions about the necessity for reform and improvement within maritime protocols to avoid similar incidents from occurring. The Hokkaido Maritime Safety Agency is expected to conduct thorough investigations to determine if additional safety regulations should be initiated. With significant regulatory review anticipated, operators of ferries like the Silver Breeze must prepare for the possibility of stricter guidelines, enhancing the overall safety environment for this popular mode of transport across Hokkaido’s coastal routes.
News
EAGLE S
The Helsinki Court of Appeal is not considering the appeal that the Finnish police have seized the 'Eagle S', which means that the tanker is still seized. Thehe decision was made on Feb 4, after the shipping company Caravella requested the release. On Dec 27, the Central Criminal Police Office made a decision to seize the ship, which the lawyer hired by the shipping company, Herman Ljungberg, appealed to the District Court. The District Court also rejected the appeal. The police suspects gross sabotage and gross disruption of postal and telecommunications traffic in the case. Of the original crew of 24 people, eight have been banned from travelling.
ADAM LNG
On Feb 4, 2025, the Government of Gibraltar has published the official report on the investigation into the collision accident and subsequent sinking of the 'OS 35' on Aug 29, 2022. The 'OS 35' had been taking bunker fuel at anchor close opposite Camp Bay. As it weighed anchor and moved to sail from Gibraltar, the master on the 'OS 35' initially manoeuvred astern but became concerned that the vessel was drifting due to the tidal flow and wind. Despite a change in manoeuvre, the 'OS 35' collided with the LNG tanker 'Adam LNG' and began taking on water as it sailed toward Europa Point before being ordered aground off Catalan Bay. The investigation was conducted in accordance with the Gibraltar Merchant Shipping (Accident Reporting and Investigation) Regulations 2012. Its primary objective was to improve maritime safety and prevent future incidents of a similar nature. In the 37-page report, the Office of the Marine Accident Investigation Compliance Officer, part of the Ministry for Business, Tourism and the Port, reached a number of conclusions about the incident and made some recommendations aimed at improving safety. The investigation found that the master and bridge team on the 'OS 35' did not monitor the departure manoeuvre effectively and made an error in their understanding of the effects of the tidal flow and wind. The Gibraltar Port Authority’s Vessel Traffic Services (VTS) monitored the manoeuvre but its interventions did not alter the actions of the master or prevent the collision. After the collision, the VTS instructed the 'OS 35' to sail into shallow water to prevent the ship from sinking. The operator of the 'OS 35' was recommended by investigators to review bridge team training and procedures prior to arrival and departure without a pilot onboard. The GPA was recommended to require VTS to provide clear advice to vessels prior to giving permission to depart from the Western Anchorage. It was also urged to consider compulsory pilotage for departing vessels, while Gibraltar Pilots, the company that provides pilotage services, was advised to offer clear information to captains on the availability of a pilot for departure from the Western Anchorage, even if this was not a requirement. The departure from the Western Anchorage in light wind and weak tidal conditions is a relatively straight forward manoeuvre, which is monitored by VTS. It was considered unlikely that the actions of VTS or the 'Adam LNG' could have prevented the collision. Had a pilot been on board the 'OS 35', the [initial] manoeuvre astern would not have been their chosen option for the location and conditions that were found on the day. Had the 'OS 35'’s turn to port been initiated as the anchor was being lifted there was sufficient sea room to continue moving ahead and turn to port to depart the anchorage to the west. There was also suitable sea room to pass between the vessels ahead, which would have provided greater control of the vessel than by manoeuvring astern, where the manoeuvre is more difficult to control and monitor, according to the report.
PUTRI PAPUA
The "KM Putri Papua" sank on the morning of Feb 4, 2025, 12 miles off the coast of Sorong, West Papua, after an engine failure, which occurred at 5.47 a.m. WIT in pos. 1° 35.934’ S – 130° 55.506’ E. The Indonesian Navy deployed the KRI ''Mata Bongsang (MBS)-873', which sighted smoke at 7.46 a.m. in pos. 1° 35.666’ S – 131° 00.440’ E in a distance of four nautical miles and received a radio transmission from the KM 'Putri Papua', but the signal was then lost. It then moved closer to carry out the evacuation. At 08.00 a.m. a lifeboat was launched, at which time the safari ship was already sinking. At 8.05 a.m. 17 people, consisting of: eight Indonesian crew members and nine Passengers (consisting of threre Indonesian citizens and six foreign nationals were rescued. Two crew members suffered minor injuries and received medical treatment. The ship then sailed towards Lantamal XIV Sorong, which was approximately 55 nautical miles away, to drop off the castaways. The sinking of the KM 'Putri Papua', a traditional wooden phinisi boat, could pose an obstacle to shipping due to its position. The cause of the engine failure and the exact circumstances of the sinking are currently being investigated. Report with photo: https://koreri.com/2025/02/04/tni-al-evakuasi-korban-km-putri-papua-yang-tenggelam-di-perairan-sorong-begini-kronoligisnya/
OS 35
On Feb 4, 2025, the Government of Gibraltar has published the official report on the investigation into the collision accident and subsequent sinking of the 'OS 35' on Aug 29, 2022. The 'OS 35' had been taking bunker fuel at anchor close opposite Camp Bay. As it weighed anchor and moved to sail from Gibraltar, the master on the 'OS 35' initially manoeuvred astern but became concerned that the vessel was drifting due to the tidal flow and wind. Despite a change in manoeuvre, the 'OS 35' collided with the LNG tanker 'Adam LNG' and began taking on water as it sailed toward Europa Point before being ordered aground off Catalan Bay. The investigation was conducted in accordance with the Gibraltar Merchant Shipping (Accident Reporting and Investigation) Regulations 2012. Its primary objective was to improve maritime safety and prevent future incidents of a similar nature. In the 37-page report, the Office of the Marine Accident Investigation Compliance Officer, part of the Ministry for Business, Tourism and the Port, reached a number of conclusions about the incident and made some recommendations aimed at improving safety. The investigation found that the master and bridge team on the 'OS 35' did not monitor the departure manoeuvre effectively and made an error in their understanding of the effects of the tidal flow and wind. The Gibraltar Port Authority’s Vessel Traffic Services (VTS) monitored the manoeuvre but its interventions did not alter the actions of the master or prevent the collision. After the collision, the VTS instructed the 'OS 35' to sail into shallow water to prevent the ship from sinking. The operator of the 'OS 35' was recommended by investigators to review bridge team training and procedures prior to arrival and departure without a pilot onboard. The GPA was recommended to require VTS to provide clear advice to vessels prior to giving permission to depart from the Western Anchorage. It was also urged to consider compulsory pilotage for departing vessels, while Gibraltar Pilots, the company that provides pilotage services, was advised to offer clear information to captains on the availability of a pilot for departure from the Western Anchorage, even if this was not a requirement. The departure from the Western Anchorage in light wind and weak tidal conditions is a relatively straight forward manoeuvre, which is monitored by VTS. It was considered unlikely that the actions of VTS or the 'Adam LNG' could have prevented the collision. Had a pilot been on board the 'OS 35', the [initial] manoeuvre astern would not have been their chosen option for the location and conditions that were found on the day. Had the 'OS 35'’s turn to port been initiated as the anchor was being lifted there was sufficient sea room to continue moving ahead and turn to port to depart the anchorage to the west. There was also suitable sea room to pass between the vessels ahead, which would have provided greater control of the vessel than by manoeuvring astern, where the manoeuvre is more difficult to control and monitor, according to the report.
