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The 'Sigrid', had some trouble when trying to dock, en route from Forvik, in Tjøtta on Nov 20, 2024, at 5.15 p.m. due to strong wind and its propulsion being fouled by a rope entangled in the propeller. Instead of approaching the quay straight, it remained alongside the quay for a long time. Then some loose rope floating in the water got stuck in one of the propellers. After about 40 minutes, the ferry was finally docked. Both the wind and the loose rope meant that one sailing in the night and one on the morning of Nov 21 were cancelled. The propeller has been examined using an underwater drone, and then the ferry returned to operation.

The 'Silba', operating on the route Zadar - Brbinj. ran onto the breakwater while docking in Božava, on the island of Dugi Otok, on Nov 21, 2024, at 3.40 p.m. The ship, the controls of which had apparently failed, did not have an auxiliary ramp. The passengers had to climb down through the door on wooden stairs provided by the locals. The passengers were disembarked without injuries, and the cause of the trouble was being determined. In the meantime. The ship has moved away from the waterfront and is tied to the shore, waiting for permission to set sail for Zadar.

On Nov 21, 2024, the Transportation Safety Board of Canada released its report into the sinking of the Mucktown Girl' and the loss of one of its five crew memberson March 12, 2022, on the Scotian Shelf. The Cape Islander was fishing 82.7 miles southeast of Canso when, near midnight on March 11, its master radioed the Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre to report electrical issues. A storm was approaching, with southerly winds forecasted to reach 50 knots. With no vessels in the area available to tow the ship, the Canadian Coast Guard vessel 'Jean Goodwill' was dispatched from Sydney. By the time of its arrival seven hours later, the 'Mucktown Girl' had lost power and was drifting. A fast rescue boat was lowered, bringing two VHF radios to the 'Mucktown Girl to allow for communication. “Because there was no damage to the vessel, it was initially assessed as disabled, not in distress or imminent distress, and therefore neither the Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre staff nor the master of the 'Jean Goodwill' suggested removing some or all the crew of the vessel. However, the 'Jean Goodwill' had no means to remove crew from the disabled vessel after weather conditions had deteriorated well beyond the specified operating limits of its fast rescue craft. With weather fast approaching, it was decided to increase the towing speed to nine knots in an attempt to reach the protection of Chedabucto Bay ahead of the storm. That speed was later dropped to eight knots as winds increased. The icebreaker extended its towline additionally to reduce the force on the much smaller fishing vessel. About six hours into the tow, the bollard on the' Mucktown Girl' failed, releasing the tow line. The winds were blowing 30-35 knots with 2.5-metre seas, and both were getting worse quickly. Within half an hour the winds had increased to up to 45 knots and waves had grown to four metres, far beyond the safe operating envelope of the coast guard’s fast response craft. The decision was made for the 'Jean Goodwill' to stand by and not seek to evacuate the crew by helicopter. To avoid striking the 'Mucktown Girl' and to lessen the waves it was tackling, the 'Jean Goodwill' moved 3.5 nautical miles away and kept in regular contact with the drifting Cape Islander. Just minutes after a 6 a.m. check-in, the 'Mucktown Girl' reported a foot and a half of water on the deck and ordered the evacuation of the vessel. The crew donned immersion suits and got into a liferaft that was initially left tied to the 'Mucktown Girl'. Upon hearing the vessel was going down, the 'Jean Goodwill' pounded at full speed toward the position. With its own rear deck awash, the crew of the icebreaker struggled to remove a scramble net and install it down the side of their vessel. Recently installed wooden decking came loose on the icebreaker’s deck and was washed around with the failed towing equipment, smashing into crewmembers. A large wave struck the 'Jean Goodwill', causing it to roll more than 30 degrees. On the main deck, the chief officer was seriously injured when he was swept against the inner bulwark. Several crew members were nearly washed overboard. Once the bridge team had learned of the chief officer’s injury, an announcement was made over the vessel’s intercom calling all available crew to the deck. A crew member on the icebreaker’s bridge was incapacitated when the ship was tossed by the seas. The crew pushed on, got the scramble net down the side and lowered a Jacob’s ladder as they came within five metres of the life raft. In the storm, radio contact with the 'Mucktown Grrl'’s master aboard the liferaft had been lost and the injury to the chief officer on the 'Jean Goodwill’s deck limited communication with its own wheelhouse. Without invitation from the 'Jean Goodwill', one of the fishermen jumped from the raft and swam toward the icebreaker’s scramble net. After several attempts and with help from the coast guard crew, he was hauled aboard. Then another fisherman jumped in the water and swam for it, also making it aboard. Two more jumped in the water while the captain remained in the raft. One made it to the scramble net and another got to the Jacob’s ladder hanging down the side of the icebreaker. Both crew members were hit by a wave, thrown back into the sea, and then drifted toward the life raft. The master of the 'Mucktown Girl', who was still in the liferaft, was able to grab hold of both crew members. He helped crew member 4 into the liferaft but lost hold of crew member 3, who drifted toward the Jean Goodwill’s stern. Crew member 3 was Jeremy Hart, 35. He would be found and retrieved hours later by a Cormorant helicopter and taken to hospital, where he was pronounced dead. The captain and crew member aboard the liferaft were rescued. The TSB made recommendations around equipment, such as the type of scramble nets to be carried by vessels, and about training with them in realistic scenarios. Those nets have already been replaced by the coast guard. As well, it raised concerns about underestimating the level of risk while towing, resulting in an increased likelihood of injuries and loss of life.

The 'Stella Rossa' sank at its berth in the port of Anzio on Nov 9, 2024. An oil boom was laid out around the ship. Only masts and superstructure had remained above the water. The wreck was raised by a mobile crane on Nov 13 and deposited on a parking lot to be broken up. Phjoto and video: https://www.shipspotting.com/photos/3783202?navList=gallery&category=39&page=1&viewType=normal&sortBy=newest https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4CQFY63H37k

The U.K. Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) has released its report into am incident in whichthe second officer (2/O) of the 'Mona Manx', actually sailing as 'Amoy Dream', who was looking over the side of the vessel died after he was struck by a recoiling mooring line, while the ship was berthing at Puerto Ventanas on Aug 26, 2021. The line had become entrapped between the vessel and the berth, probably in way of a fender, then suddenly released as the vessel maneuvered astern under its own power. “At 0836:11, the 2/O arrived near the forward end of the accommodation ladder … and looked over the side rail directly above the slack spring line while using a very high frequency (VHF) radio …. A few seconds later, the spring line tightened and then slackened. At 0836:23, the 2/O appeared to use the VHF radio again as the spring line came under tension once more. At 0836:31, a linesman on the quay was moving forward towards the tensioned spring line when a loud bang was heard as the line suddenly released and recoiled vertically upwards … The linesman quickly moved away but the spring line struck the 2/O under his chin and he was lifted off his feet and thrown backwards, causing his head to strike the accommodation ladder that was behind and above him. The force of the impact threw his safety helmet backwards, and his VHF radio was catapulted into the water as he collapsed onto the deck. The 2/O was found by AB3, who had made their way forward to search for him. On seeing the 2/O lying in a large pool of blood, AB3 immediately ran back to the aft mooring deck and used AB1’s VHF radio to notify the master that the 2/O had been seriously injured. Within seconds, the pilot requested medical assistance from the port and then directed the tugs to hold Mona Manx alongside. The berthing operation was suspended. At 0839, a shore gangway was placed on board Mona Manx and the port’s medical team boarded the vessel a minute later. At 0850, the 2/O was pronounced deceased at the scene.” Among the safety issues MAIB indentifies are: - The 2/O moved to the danger zone to obtain a better view of the mooring line as the vessel maneuvered astern: - The use of the vessel’s engines to maneuver along the berth was in contravention of the port’s procedures; - The Code of Safe Working Practices for Merchant Seafarers (COSWP) did not address the hazards of mooring line entrapment or vertical recoil; - The master/pilot exchange (MPX) completed before the operation did not include all available information; - The crew had not been briefed on the manoeuvre and the hazards associated with mooring line recoil were not mitigated; - Radio congestion may have reduced the crew’s ability to safely conduct the operation. The port company, Puerto Ventanas S.A, is recommended to review and update the information made available to masters and pilots before a port call, including instructions that engines are not to be used to conduct maneuvers while moored alongside and guidance on the risks associated with line entrapment on shore fixtures and fittings, such as fenders. The Quintero Port Authority was recommended to ensure that the master/pilot exchanges conducted by its pilots consider the risks associated with mooring line entrapment and recoil and vessels maneuvering alongside using their engines. Full report: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/673c705af2eda558e9494e7c/2024-18-MonaManx.pdf