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On April 3, 2025, at 5.36 a.m. the 'Lady Irene' caught fire in Cape Cod Bay while berthed at the Wellfleet Marina, Massachusetts. The fire started on the fishing vessel and quickly spread to the supporting structure on the pier. It continued to spread to a second fishing vessel when the Wellfleet fire department arrived on the scene. Firefighting operations commenced from the pier, as access to the fishing vessel was significantly constrained. Additional assistance was requested from the Truro, Eastham, Orleans, and Harwich fire departments, as well as the U.S. Coast Guard The Wellfleet Shellfish Warden, Harbormaster, and the Department of Public Works provided essential logistical support. The firefighters successfully brought the fire on the fishing vessel under control; however, they continued to manage persistent hotspots. Attention then shifted to the pier, where extinguishing the fire proved particularly challenging due to its construction materials and limited accessibility. The crews were able to knock the fire down at 10 a.m. The utilization of vessels from the Harbormaster and the U.S. Coast Guard facilitated the firefighting efforts, with hoses connected to fire trucks. As a precautionary measure, the Barnstable County Dive Team was requested and placed on standby, along with the Massachusetts Department of Fire Services' Rehab truck, to ensure firefighter safety. Furthermore, hazardous material booms were deployed around the entire pier to contain potential contaminants and safeguard the shellfish grants.Both the 'Lady Irene' and the second vessel suffered significant damage to the hull and superstructure, but remained afloat. Notification has been made to the State Fire Marshal, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP), all of whom have been requested to attend the scene for the purpose of investigation. A determination regarding the cause of the fire has yet to be established, as the investigation conducted by the Fire Marshal was ongoing. Reports with photos: https://eu.capecodtimes.com/story/news/fire/2025/04/03/firefighters-wellfleet-town-pier/82790061007/ https://eu.capecodtimes.com/picture-gallery/news/2025/04/03/early-morning-fishing-boat-fire-wellfleet-town-pier/82794658007/

On April 3, the Royal New Zealand Navy released its final Court of Inquiry report detailing the circumstances that led to the loss of the HMNZS 'Manawanui', while conducting a hydrographic survey of a reef. Nine recommendations were outlined in the report, focusing on risk management, procedural improvements, force generation, seaworthiness standards, training protocols, and hydrographic capabilities. The Court of Inquiry, presided over by Commodore Melissa Ross, identified direct causes including the ship maintaining a heading toward land and confusion over the vessel’s autopilot status. Critically, the crew attempted to adjust course using azimuth thruster controls while the ship remained in autopilot mode, rendering their actions ineffective. The situation was compounded by a mistaken assessment of thruster control failure and subsequent non-adherence to emergency procedures, which should have included switching from autopilot to manual control: “The Court found deficiencies in the training and qualifications of key ship’s personnel involved in the incident, risks related to the survey task were not sufficiently identified, discussed and mitigated, and instructions or procedures were lacking.” The investigation revealed that the ship’s Commanding Officer was not platform endorsed for the vessel, a requirement specified in the New Zealand Manual of Navigation. Chief of the Navy Rear Admiral Garin Golding acknowledged the findings, highlighting a concerning gap between work as imagined and work as done. The Navy has already implemented several corrective measures, including reviews of risk management procedures and training protocols. The investigation identified twelve contributing factors, including training and experience deficiencies, inadequate military hydrographic planning, procedural issues, supervision gaps, and leadership concerns. The Navy announced plans for a comprehensive transformation program to address systemic issues, including the lack of standardization across the fleet. Full report: https://www.nzdf.mil.nz/assets/Uploads/DocumentLibrary/MAN-COI-ROP-FINAL-31-Mar-25_Redacted-v2.pdf

The MAIB has published and interim report on the investigation of the collision between the 'Solong' and the 'Stena Immaculate'. On 27 February 2025, the tanker had departed Agioi Theodoroi with a cargo of 220,204.5 barrels1 of aviation fuel onboard, bound for Killingholme with an ETA as of March 11.The container ship was engaged in fixed tradein the North Sea, sailing between Rotterdam, Grangemouth and Hull. On March 10, its containerised cargo included various products including some designated asdangerous goods. As the 'Stena Immaculate' approached the Humber Estuary on March 9, the officer of the watch contacted the Associate British Ports (ABP) Vessel Traffic Services Humber and was advised to proceed to anchor at a position five miles to the north of the Humber light float, two miles clear of any pipeline. At about 6.30 p.m., the 'Stena Immaculate'’s master manoeuvred the vessel as directed to a position north of the ABP Humber’s area of responsibility where it anchored. There were eight other vessels anchored in the same area.By 8 p.m.m the 'Solong' had departed Grangemouth, disembarked the pilot and commenced its passage to Rotterdam. The planned passage followed a route the vessel had used in the past. The master remained on watch until shortly before 11 p.m., then handed the watch over to the second officer (2/O) and retired to bed. Shortly before midnight, the 'Stena Immaculate'’s 2/O took over the anchor watch at the start of a 12-hour duty period. On March 10 at approximately 0130 a.m. the 'Solong' passed the Longstone Lighthouse and altered course onto a heading of approximately 150°. The 'Solong' maintained this course, except for a slight deviation at 03.45 a.m. At 07:00 a.m., the 'Solong'’s master returned to the bridge and took over the watch as the lone watchkeeper.The visibility in the area north of the Humber light float was reported to be patchy and varying between 0.25 nautical miles (nm) and 2.0 nm. Neither the 'Solong' nor the 'Stena Immaculate' had a dedicated lookout on the bridge.At 09.47 a.m., the 'Solong' allided with the anchored 'Stena Immaculate'’s port side on a heading (HDG) of 150° and speed over the ground (SOG) of about 16 knots (kts) The able seaman Mark Pernia, one of the 'Solong'’s crew members, was reported to be in the forecastle area at the time of the allision, which breached the 'Stena Immaculate'’s No.7 port side cargo tank, releasing aviation fuel into the sea and onto the bow of the 'Solong'. The aviation fuel was ignited by the heat generated by the force of the alision, and the resulting fire ignited the contents of containers carried on board. The crews of both the 'Solong' and the 'Stena Immaculate'' took immediate action to address the evolving situation. Attempts by the 'Stena Immaculate'’s crew to fight the fire, and for the 'Solong'’s crew to locate the missing able seaman, were hampered by the severity of the fire. The tanker crew fought the fire for around 30 minutes. They had good pressure. and the Third Mate Jeffery Griffin was about to do a muster when they heard the words, forget the muster, abandon ship. The evacuation became urgent when the wind or the position of the ship changed. All the smoke came towards the accomodation block. Despite the dangerous conditions, the crew maintained their composure and moved in the most organized but urgent way. They did a quick muster at the lifeboat. The second mate did a fast head count. Everybody did exactly what they were trained to do. The captain Thomas Leaf and the second mate Peter Skerys in particular processed all the information so quickly, and formulated a gameplan. The crew’s quick thinking and training proved crucial. Before abandoning ship, they activated fire monitors to provide boundary cooling water to adjacent cargo tanks, significantly limiting the damage. Only 17,515 barrels of the cargo were lost. Both the 'Stena Immaculate' and 'Solong'’s crew abandoned to lifeboats and were subsequently recovered by the efforts of local boats and emergency responders, coordinated by the British Coastguard. Mark Pernia has not been found and is believed to have died in the accident.. An evaluation of the nature and extent of pollution from both vessels is in progress. The MAIB’s investigation into the accident is ongoing. The investigation will encompass the navigationand watch keeping practices on board both vessels; manning and fatigue management; the condition and maintenance of the vessels; the use of the offshore area as an anchorage for vessels waiting to enter the Humber Estuary; and the environmental conditions at the time. A report of the investigation will be drafted and will be distributed to key stakeholders for a 30-day consultationperiod in due course. The 'Stena 'Immaculate' remained moored in pos. 53° 44' N 000° 24' E as of April 4. Report with photos: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/67ebb6a1632d0f88e8248ada/Solong-StenaImmaculate-InterimReport.pdf

On the afternoon of April 2, 2025, the Port Authority of Rhodes was informed by the Captain of the 'Sempeko', that a malfunction of the starboard main engine was detected during the execution of the scheduled route from Rhodes to Symi outside the commercial port of Rhodes, The ship sailed independently at reduced speed to the port of Kolona, ​​Rhodes, where it safely disembarked its 53 passengers. With the care of the ship-owning company, the passengers were accommodated in a hotel. The Central Port Authority of Rhodes banned the passenger ferry from sailing, until the damage was repaired and a certificate of seaworthiness from the monitoring classification society was presented.

The MAIB has published and interim report on the investigation of the collision between the 'Solong' and the 'Stena Immaculate'. On 27 February 2025, the tanker had departed Agioi Theodoroi with a cargo of 220,204.5 barrels1 of aviation fuel onboard, bound for Killingholme with an ETA as of March 11.The container ship was engaged in fixed tradein the North Sea, sailing between Rotterdam, Grangemouth and Hull. On March 10, its containerised cargo included various products including some designated asdangerous goods. As the 'Stena Immaculate' approached the Humber Estuary on March 9, the officer of the watch contacted the Associate British Ports (ABP) Vessel Traffic Services Humber and was advised to proceed to anchor at a position five miles to the north of the Humber light float, two miles clear of any pipeline. At about 6.30 p.m., the 'Stena Immaculate'’s master manoeuvred the vessel as directed to a position north of the ABP Humber’s area of responsibility where it anchored. There were eight other vessels anchored in the same area.By 8 p.m.m the 'Solong' had departed Grangemouth, disembarked the pilot and commenced its passage to Rotterdam. The planned passage followed a route the vessel had used in the past. The master remained on watch until shortly before 11 p.m., then handed the watch over to the second officer (2/O) and retired to bed. Shortly before midnight, the 'Stena Immaculate'’s 2/O took over the anchor watch at the start of a 12-hour duty period. On March 10 at approximately 0130 a.m. the 'Solong' passed the Longstone Lighthouse and altered course onto a heading of approximately 150°. The 'Solong' maintained this course, except for a slight deviation at 03.45 a.m. At 07:00 a.m., the 'Solong'’s master returned to the bridge and took over the watch as the lone watchkeeper.The visibility in the area north of the Humber light float was reported to be patchy and varying between 0.25 nautical miles (nm) and 2.0 nm. Neither the 'Solong' nor the 'Stena Immaculate' had a dedicated lookout on the bridge.At 09.47 a.m., the 'Solong' allided with the anchored 'Stena Immaculate'’s port side on a heading (HDG) of 150° and speed over the ground (SOG) of about 16 knots (kts) The able seaman Mark Pernia, one of the 'Solong'’s crew members, was reported to be in the forecastle area at the time of the allision, which breached the 'Stena Immaculate'’s No.7 port side cargo tank, releasing aviation fuel into the sea and onto the bow of the 'Solong'. The aviation fuel was ignited by the heat generated by the force of the alision, and the resulting fire ignited the contents of containers carried on board. The crews of both the 'Solong' and the 'Stena Immaculate'' took immediate action to address the evolving situation. Attempts by the 'Stena Immaculate'’s crew to fight the fire, and for the 'Solong'’s crew to locate the missing able seaman, were hampered by the severity of the fire. The tanker crew fought the fire for around 30 minutes. They had good pressure. and the Third Mate Jeffery Griffin was about to do a muster when they heard the words, forget the muster, abandon ship. The evacuation became urgent when the wind or the position of the ship changed. All the smoke came towards the accomodation block. Despite the dangerous conditions, the crew maintained their composure and moved in the most organized but urgent way. They did a quick muster at the lifeboat. The second mate did a fast head count. Everybody did exactly what they were trained to do. The captain Thomas Leaf and the second mate Peter Skerys in particular processed all the information so quickly, and formulated a gameplan. The crew’s quick thinking and training proved crucial. Before abandoning ship, they activated fire monitors to provide boundary cooling water to adjacent cargo tanks, significantly limiting the damage. Only 17,515 barrels of the cargo were lost. Both the 'Stena Immaculate' and 'Solong'’s crew abandoned to lifeboats and were subsequently recovered by the efforts of local boats and emergency responders, coordinated by the British Coastguard. Mark Pernia has not been found and is believed to have died in the accident.. An evaluation of the nature and extent of pollution from both vessels is in progress. The MAIB’s investigation into the accident is ongoing. The investigation will encompass the navigationand watch keeping practices on board both vessels; manning and fatigue management; the condition and maintenance of the vessels; the use of the offshore area as an anchorage for vessels waiting to enter the Humber Estuary; and the environmental conditions at the time. A report of the investigation will be drafted and will be distributed to key stakeholders for a 30-day consultationperiod in due course. Report with photos: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/67ebb6a1632d0f88e8248ada/Solong-StenaImmaculate-InterimReport.pdf