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Chesapeake Bay Bridge fails to meet allision standards, risk assessment In response to Francis Scott Key Bridge collapse shows

In response to the collapse of the Francis Scott Key Bridge in Baltimore after the allision of the 'Dali' on March 26, 2024,, the Maryland Transportation Authority (MDTA) has revealed that the William Preston Lane Jr. Memorial Bay Bridge (aka the Chesapeake Bay Bridge) does not meet current vessel collision risk standards, prompting the development of comprehensive safety measures in the frame of the of MDTA’s response to the National Transportation Safety Board’s (NTSB) interim accident report and urgent safety recommendations. The NTSB report found that the Key Bridge had a risk level nearly 30 times above the acceptable threshold for critical bridges. Despite the Bay Bridge’s compliance with its federal permit and annual inspections confirming safe conditions for over 30 years, MDTA voluntarily initiated a $160 million project in spring 2024 to evaluate bridge protection. The authority has already invested more than $175 million in bridge safety and security infrastructure over the past decade. The MDTA engaged Moffatt & Nichol (M&N), a leading firm in vessel allision design of bridges, to conduct the risk assessment. The firm’s staff includes the principal author of the AASHTO vessel allision requirements and previously taught Federal Highway Administration courses on vessel collision analysis. The assessment evaluated both the eastbound and westbound spans of the Bay Bridge, constructed in 1952 and 1973 respectively, using the most current AASHTO Bridge Design Specifications and Guide Specifications for an allision. In response, MDTA was developing both immediate and long-term risk reduction strategies. Short-term measures may include new communication protocols for vessel pilots, reduced vessel speeds, one-way transits, and enhanced traffic management. Long-term solutions could involve physical protection measures such as dolphins and pier fenders. The timing of these safety measures coincided with the MDTA’s ongoing study of potentially replacing the existing Bay Bridge spans. The authority has confirmed it will ensure current safety improvements don’t interfere with future replacement plans. The evaluation was part of a broader national safety initiative following the Key Bridge collapse. The NTSB identified 68 other bridges nationwide frequented by ocean-going vessels that were constructed before the 1991 AASHTO guidance and have not undergone recent vulnerability assessments. The MDTA will coordinate its risk reduction measures with the U.S. Coast Guard and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, ensuring alignment with the interdisciplinary team approach recommended by the NTSB.

11 crew members still stuck in Baltimore

11 higher ranked crew members of the 'Dali' are still stuck inBaltimore, one year after the allision with the Francis Scott Key Bridge in Baltimore on March 26, 2025. The sailors have been asked to stay while the incident is still being investigated by the Federal authorities. Ten other crew members were sent home in June. The affected crew members, who are mainly from India, have spent the past year in hotels. Synergy Marine, the company behind the 'Dali', has been paying the crew’s living expenses and salaries since they were accomodated there. The US has given three crew members permission to return to India temporarily for urgent matters, such as a medical procedure and a wedding. Some of the crew members’ families have come to Baltimore to visit them.

NTSB: Baltimore Key Bridge collapse risk was 30 times above acceptable zhreshold

On March 20, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) revealed that the Francis Scott Key Bridge, which collapsed following the 'Dali' allided with it, had a risk level nearly 30 times above the acceptable threshold for critical bridges. The agency has identified 68 bridges across 19 states that require immediate vulnerability assessments, including the Golden Gate Bridge, Chesapeake Bay Bridge, Verrazano Narrows Bridge, and Greater New Orleans Bridge, among others. These bridges, all designed before current safety guidelines were established, were lacking current vulnerability assessments for allision risks. The NTSB recommended that 30 bridge owners should evaluate their structures against American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials’ (AASHTO) acceptable risk levels. The Maryland Transportation Authority (MTDA) failed to conduct a recommended vulnerability assessment, developed in response to the 1980 Sunshine Skyway Bridge disaster in Tampa, Florida, which would have revealed concerning findings about the Key Bridge’s condition. Had they ran the calculation on the Francis Scott Key Bridge, the MDTA would’ve been aware that the bridge was almost 30 times greater than the risk threshold AASHTO sets for critical essential Bridges. 30 times greater- Not only did the MDTA fail to conduct the vulnerability assessment on the Key Bridge, but also did not provide, nor were they able to provide, the NTSB with the data needed to conduct the assessment, including the characteristics of vessel traffic passing under the bridge, vessel transit speeds, vessel loading characteristics, waterway and navigable channel geometry, water depth, environmental conditions, bridge geometry, pier protection systems, and ultimate lateral capacity of the bridge piers. In total, the NTSB has issued four urgent safety recommendations to select bridge owners, the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), the US Coast Guard, and the US Army Corps of Engineers to safeguard bridges from vessel strikes, part of an interim accident report released today. Recent findings from the NTSB also have uncovered critical details about the 'Dali'’s power failure. Preliminary investigations revealed that electrical breakers HR1 and LR1 unexpectedly tripped when the vessel was approximately three ship lengths from the bridge, resulting in a total blackout. NTSB investigators discovered an interruption in the control circuit for HR1’s undervoltage release system. The investigation has also brought to light that the 'Dali' suffered two separate power blackouts the day before the incident. The first occurred when a crew member accidentally blocked the generator’s exhaust gas stack, while the second was attributed to insufficient fuel pressure. The NTSB’s recommendations extend beyond individual bridge assessments. The agency was calling for an interdisciplinary team comprising the Federal Highway Administration, U.S. Coast Guard, and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to provide guidance on risk evaluation and reduction strategies. Since 1994, the Federal Highway Administration has required new bridges to be designed with consideration for vessel collision risks. However, the Key Bridge, constructed before these requirements, fell outside these modern safety standards. The NTSB’s investigation into the accident was continuing. The NTSB interim report can be found here: https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/MIR2510.pdf