AIVIQ

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Aiviq's engine failure and inadequate assessment of risks caused Kulluk loss

The National Transportation Safety Board blamed the 2012 grounding and wreck of Shell’s Arctic drilling rig "Kulluk" on the inadequate assessment of the risk of towing it across the Gulf of Alaska in a winter storm. No single error or mechanical failure led to the accident, the NTSB said in findings recently released. Rather, shortcomings in the design of a plan with an insufficient margin of safety allowed the accident to take place. The plan was created to move the conical drilling unit at a time of year with a known likelihood of severe weather conditions for reasons unrelated to operational safety. The "Kulluk" broke its tow lines, an effort to reattach failed and the drilling ship went aground Dec. 31, 2012, on uninhabited Sitkalidak Island near Kodiak. “The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probably cause of the grounding of the mobile offshore drilling unit Kulluk was Shell’s inadequate assessment of the risk for its planned tow of the Kulluk, resulting in implementation of a tow plan insufficient to mitigate that risk.” The "Kulluk", bound for a Seattle shipyard, sustained irreparable damage, was scrapped and has been replaced in 2015 by the "Polar Pioneer", currently berthed at Terminal 5 in the Port of Seattle. Shell has not gone back to the Arctic since its debacle-filled 2012 drilling effort. It completed just the top portion of one well in the Chukchi Sea before drilling rigs were forced to retreat before moving pack ice. The oil giant hoped to use the "Polar Pioneer" and "Noble Discoverer" to drill six wells during the brief season in summer and early fall in which the Chukchi Sea is ice free. The U.S. Coast Guard, faulted Shell and its subcontractor for choosing to tow the "Kulluk" across the Gulf of Alaska, notorious for experiencing some of the world’s worst late fall/early winter storm. It hinted that the "Kulluk" was seeking to get out of Alaska waters to avoid a state tax bill that would have kicked in on Jan. 1, 2013. A subcontractor, Edison Chouest, began towing the "Kulluk" and its support vessel, the "Alviq", out of Dutch Harbor in the Aleutian Islands on Dec 21, 2012. On Dec 27, battered by storms near Kodiak Island, the "Kulluk"’s tow line broke and the "Aviq"’s engines failed. The Coast Guard evacuated almost all of the "Kulluk"’s crew, tried to connect a new tow line and furnished "Aviq" with spare parts. The briefly reattached tow line broke again. The "Kulluk" crunched onto Sitkalidak just three hours and 12 minutes before the end of 2012. The 2015 Shell drilling plan has been approved by the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, an arm of the U.S. Interior Department. It must still pass muster with the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement.

Engine failure due to water intrusion caused Kulluk grounding

An engine failure of the "Aiviq" as it struggled to keep towlines on Shell’s conical drill vessel "Kulluk" caused the grounding off Kodiak Island while the tug was transporting the "Kulluk" from Dutch Harbor to Seattle for winter maintenance end of December 2012. All four of the engines on the" Aiviq" quitted,, a Report of the U.S. Coast Guard report on the grounding showed, which was released April 3. Seawater had gotten into the fuel system through vents on the deck that were exposed to waves buffeting the "Aiviq" while the rear deck of the vessel, including the vents, was submerged. The design of the newly-built "Aiviq" led to the vents being placed in a way that they would be exposed to water in rough seas. Due to the "Aiviq" design, water regularly washed onto the aft working deck area during high seas particularly while towing. This seawater tended to be carried back and forth across the deck as the "Aiviq" rolled. Very heavy weather encountered on Dec. 27, created an environment where the tank vent would be subject to water immersion, potentially being completely submerged at times. Any failure of the vents would allow water into the common vent/overflow Header from where it could enter the fuel system under certain circumstances. The Coast Guard also criticized Edison Chouest for operating the fuel system in a way that was different than the prescribed procedure but also added that had the "Aiviq" operated under the approved fuel system configuration, it is not clear whether it would have mitigated or prevented the loss of the main engines because the vent system still offered a means for water intrusion into the tanks. The report was also critical of actions of the vessel’s chief engineer in gauging possible water intrusion. The Chief Engineer did not realize the potential for water intrusion through the vents. The "Aiviq" engineering personnel did not use the redundant fuel management systems aboard the tug to protect the critical fuel system from contamination. Protective fuel system configurations, intended to segregate all engines and generators in approved guidance was not following. In addition, no formal fuel management procedures were onboard the Aiviq for crew use and reference. The Coast Guard also said water contamination and other fuel purification issues were noted in engineering logs immediately prior to the casualty, or grounding. Tests at the Delta Western bulk fuel tanks in Dutch Harbor on the same ultra-low sulfur diesel loaded onto the "Aiviq" before its departure revealed no water contamination. However, the tests did exhibit an unusual and unexplained characteristic wherein an emulsion formed when the fuel was mixed with fresh water or seawater The Coast Guard also found extensive corrosion on the main engine and generator injector internal parts. This corrosion contributed to a failure of the injectors of the main engines. The Coast Guard report mainly singled out risk management practices by both Shell and Edison Chouest for criticism. Also the lack of experience of Edison Chouest in northern Waters was cited. The Report concluded, that a series of events contributed to the causal factors that resulted in the grounding of the "Kulluk", with the most significant factor being the inadequate assessment and management of risks associated with a complex vessel movement during the winter in the unique and challenging operating environment of Alaska. The most significant factor was the decision to make the voyage in the winter. Shell and Edison Chouest were critizised for risk management and also their application of towing measures. The master, chief engineer and third mate of the "Aiviq" may have been negligent, and the vessel Aiviq had experienced problems prior to the accident that were not reported to the Coast Guard. The incidents are now under investigation. Edson Chouest or other companies were recommended working in the Arctic develop specific guidelines, safety checklists and other procedures. The risks associated with a single vessel tow by a new purpose-built vessel of a unique conical-shaped hull, with people aboard, in winter Alaskan waters, where weather systems and sea are expected to rapidly develop, were extremely high. The report made several safety recommendations including that the U.S. Coast Guard Commandant and the Towing Safety Advisory Council establish a working group to draft a statement addressing issues raised by the accident, and other issues related to towing offshore drilling units in the Arctic. The report also recommended a review of standards for ocean towing systems to include “nspections and non-destructive testing of towing equipment, detailed review of tow configurations to include history of towing equipment such as shackles, connector links and bridge chains. Shell promised to reviewi the Coast Guard’s report on the Kulluk towing incident. They have implemented lessons learned from the internal review of the 2012 operations. These improvements were to be measured against the findings in the U.S.C.G. report as well as recommendations from the US Department of Interior.

Aiviq escorting Kulluk-tow

The "Aiviq" on Feb 26 was escorting the tugs "Corbin Foss", "Ocean Wave" and "Lauren Foss" which were towing the conical drilling unit "Kulluk" from Kiliuda Bay, 48 miles southwest of Kodiak City, Alaska, to Dutch Harbor for further transport to Asia. The tugs "Warrior" and "Guardsman" and the "Nanuq" were also on scene to assist. A safety zone has been established around the Kulluk and an Air Station Kodiak MH-60 Jayhawk helicopter crew overflew the area to confirm there were no security concerns. Report with photos: http://www.uscgnews.com/go/doc/4007/1712119/Multimedia-Release-Coast-Guard-conducts-overflight-of-Kulluk-tow-from-Kiliuda-Bay-Alaska